First-Person Knowledge: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and "Therapy"

The recent publication of The New Wittgenstein signals the arrival of a distinctive "therapeutic" reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein"s philosophical enterprise. As announced in its Preface, this collection presents the "nonsense" of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein"s therapeutic work. The simple, plain nonsense of many philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein"s investigations, according to this interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks "fail to make any claim at all" (Crary 6). This view of Wittgenstein"s use of "nonsense" as a term of criticism begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of Wittgenstein"s concerns, elevating "nonsense" to a central position in his philosophy. This paper argues that, in at least one case of Wittgenstein"s talk of nonsense, this "therapeutic reading" (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety of Wittgenstein"s writing. Indeed, one of the most prominent cases of "nonsense" in the later Wittgenstein concerns the remark "I know I am in pain". Though Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology. Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able to find what sense a remark such as "I know I am in pain" might perhaps have. "I know I am in pain" may be called nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in Wittgenstein"s text: as Cavell says, ""it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does)" (Cavell 70). Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to what the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein would have us suppose. Therefore, at least in one case, the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong

The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone: The Shaping of Capital Markets

Capital Markets, Transition Economies, EMU

Offshoring to new shores: Nearshoring to Central and Eastern Europe

Offshoring of IT services and back-office services to low-wage countries is a fast-growing market. Besides India, the pacesetter and dominant insourcer, there are numerous other countries and regions attempting to establish themselves as offshoring locations. Our report focuses on nearshoring locations in Central and Eastern Europe. An increasing number of examples confirm the growing importance of this region. However, a precise comparison of the attributes of different locations reveals that Central and Eastern Europe only leads the way in specific areas and for tasks with specific requirements.Offshoring, IT industry, Central and Eastern Europe

India's specialisation in IT exports: Offshoring can't defy gravity

India’s actual export specialisation in IT services is unrivalled by any comparable country and it is evidence of a strong comparative advantage. This paper finds that India owes its IT specialisation in part to its reliance on offshoring - driven by the supply of well-educated, English-speaking and affordable workers - but also to a shift away from high-tech manufacturing exports. Going forward, India's specialisation on IT and other high-tech exports may decline as rising wages erode one of the reasons for offshoring.International trade, comparative advantage, offshoring, India

India's specialisation in IT exports: Offshoring can't defy gravity

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A Gesture of Understanding: Wittgenstein, Moore, and "Therapy�

Wittgenstein scholarship appears currently to be engaging\ud in a deepening debate over the role of nonsense in\ud Wittgenstein"s later philosophical work. For one party to\ud this engagement, Wittgenstein"s later work pursues the\ud project of exposing nonsense when it emerges during the\ud course of philosophical discussions, and thereby provides\ud a kind of therapeutic assistance to those philosophers who\ud might otherwise have defended positions whose tenets\ud include nonsensical remarks that "do not say anything�\ud (Crary 5). This therapeutic reading argues in The New\ud Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein in America particularly in the\ud hands of James Conant that an austere interpretation of\ud the role of nonsense in the Tractatus can be successfully\ud extended to account for the project of Wittgenstein"s later\ud writings as well. Opposing this therapeutic reading of\ud Wittgenstein, P.M.S. Hacker has argued that Wittgenstein\ud sees nonsense as arising from our attempts to deny\ud grammatical rules by forming "nonsense which violates the\ud grammar� (Baker 279)

Data Estimation and Interpretation: An Analysis.

There is an ostensible relationship between whether or not a nation is developed and the interpretation and collection of data in this nation. For instance, if a country is developing, it is difficult to collect figures, though much simpler to interpret them. The opposite is the case in a developed nation: the gathering of data is undemanding, however, the explanation for this data is difficult. Such a relationship has a quite pressing effect on economic performance, and this will be examined using a model assuming Rational Expectations, Adaptive Expectations and certain postulates of Price Theory.Economic Data; Price Theory; Rational Expectations; Adaptive Expectations